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INTRODUCTION
As a federal judge, Chief Judge Edward R. Becker has served the
country-and the word "served" is no euphemism when applied to
him-for thirty years. First a trial judge, then an appellate judge, and
now the Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, his tenure on the federal bench literally spans a
generation, and at this point he is the fourth most senior active
federal judge.' A career in the judiciary such as Chief Judge Becker's
gives us an opportunity to reflect on not only this remarkable man but
also on the role of the judiciary in our constitutional scheme.
This Tribute is divided into two parts. First, Chief Judge Becker is
the quintessential "mensch," the Yiddish word for a fundamentally
good man. He is the virtuous man that the Framers hoped would be
attracted to public service because they believed such men were
necessary to make this experiment in constitutional democracy work.2
The second part is a survey of Judge Becker's opinions on First
Amendment issues, which provides not only a sense of his high
standards as ajudge but also a window into the remarkable depth and
breadth of the constitutional issues a federal judge can be asked to
address over time.
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I. CHIEFJUDGE BECKER, THE MAN
A tribute to Chief Judge Becker such as this is the minimum due
him, and it is an honor to be one of those given the pleasure of
singing his praises. He is a man of greatjudgment, integrity, and high
moral values. As one fortunate enough to have been one of his clerks,
from 1988 to 1989, I can testify to his remarkable qualities.
This is surely the only appellate clerkship in the United States
where the judge greets his new clerks on their first day with a single
rule: "no deference." One soon learns that the chambers (not just
the judge and not just the clerk assigned to the particular case)
debates the legal issues presented in many of the cases and that the
judge desires, and even demands, that each clerk engage her
judgment and tell him what she thinks of a case, including what she
thinks of his views. Substance is the order of the day, but so is
cordiality and good humor. The underlying assumption is never the
rote application of a static law, but rather the exercise ofjudgment-
even wisdom-in the context of a legal system that is dynamic but
stable.
Judge Becker's elevation of substance over form is apparent in
many aspects of his judicial role. Oral arguments before him are
famous for going well beyond the court's prescribed time limits. Two
motives are quite clear from the judge's refusal to abide by such
limitations. First, he thinks that every relevant issue deserves a
hearing, so if an issue he believes is important is not addressed at the
argument or even in the briefs, he opens the forum to that discussion.
Second, his job is to serve the litigants, not to control them needlessly,
so if there is meritorious discussion to be had, he welcomes it,
regardless of time constraints.
In chambers, the discussions between clerks and the judge are
remarkable seminars in legal reasoning, with doctrine, common
sense, and the question of "what is the right thing to do" taking turns.
Because of the "no deference" rule, clerks must work hard, inevitably
learn a tremendous amount, and are nurtured to improve their legal
faculties. Those of us lucky enough to clerk for him often tell each
other we had one of the very best clerkships in the country.
The judge, of course, did not simply adapt the consensus of the
clerks' views from our debates in chambers, but rather himself
determined the bottom line, discerned the points that must be made
in each opinion, and meticulously critiqued every proposal by any
clerk. While there may have been "no deference," there was a very
high standard of excellence and diligence set by the judge himself.
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No one works harder than he does; he is a man who believes rightly
that every detail matters, who reads every brief in chambers with care,
and who, because of the number of briefs filed, reads briefs in every
spare moment, from his rides to chambers on the Market-Frankford
elevated train to the precious minutes spent shaving (the results of
which would indicate that this may be a dangerous habit).
His memory is prodigious both for people-if he does not know
one of your cousins, you probably don't have any-and for detail. Not
infrequently, he asks a clerk what she thinks about a seemingly
irrelevant point that has been nagging him since he read the briefs
(and that the clerk assumed was surplusage), only to take the
discussion and debate down new paths necessary to reach a right
holding in the case. For this reason, clerking for Judge Becker is not
unlike being on Jeopardy! for five to six days out of every week, but it is
more importantly a daily lesson in professional responsibility. Because
of his attention to detail and nuance, his opinions tend to be
comprehensive, careful, and extremely useful as a legal resource.
The standard of excellence in the Becker chambers is a standard
that is derived from the judge's strong sense of being a public servant,
one who is literally serving the public through the administration of
justice. This sense of his mission resonates with the longstanding
United States rule thatjudicial opinions belong to the people, not the
judges who write them or the reporters who report them. 3 He has
translated this principle of service to the public not only into the work
ethic of his chambers, but also the practices of the Third Circuit,
where, as ChiefJudge, he has made it much more difficult to issue so-
called judgment orders-unpublished opinions that declare a result
without full explanation or precedential value.4
Judge Becker's public service does not end with his dedication to
a thoughtful, diligent, and careful jurisprudence. He has been a
workhorse for the Sentencing Guidelines, as a member of the
executive committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States,
and through individual efforts to improve the federal judiciary,
including an unfortunately failed campaign to set the date ofjudicial
Ssr Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 654-68 (1834) (holding that
repo rters may not hold copyrights in judicial opinions).
.StAnautasoffv. United States, 235 F.3d 1054, 1056 (8th Cir. 2000) (leaving open
the question of the constitutionality of the Eighth Circuit's Rule 28A(i), decreeing that
unpublished opinions have no precedential effect). The court's reasoning was that
while no opinion could have absolutely no precedential effect, the disturbing trend
towards unpublished opinions did not permit the judiciary to dodge its obligations to
the litigants.
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clerkship hiring in the spring of the second year of law school.-' The
people simply could not ask for more from a federal judge-
unflagging, unstinting, in short, remarkable.
What makes Judge Becker more than remarkable, though, is the
fact that his extraordinary work ethic, which is not so uncommon
among highly successful attorneys after all, has flowered in the midst
of a life devoted to family and friends, clear enjoyment of his duties,
and a commitment to good health. Here is a man whom we would all
do well to emulate, to the extent that we can. He is not the
workaholic his productivity might indicate if it were the result of any
other human's endeavor, but one who has a rich life beyond his work.
In fact, his family is a visible presence in every aspect of his life and he
fits exercise into a schedule most of us mortals would believe had no
such room. When I clerked for him, his mother was an invalid who
lived alone in an apartment in Center City, Philadelphia. We would
regularly depart from the courthouse and, with the judge setting a
brisk pace, discuss one aspect of a case one way, and another aspect of
that, or another case, on the way back. In the middle, he made sure
his mother's needs were met and showed us that family devotion can
and should be sewn into the fabric of the day, not shoved to the
perimeter. For me, he was just the antidote to the law firm associate I
met while interviewing at New York firms for a summer job during law
school, who told me that he had never seen his children in the
daylight.
His love of family extends well beyond his immediate family to his
family of law clerks, his staff, and his many friends and acquaintances.
As his "no deference" policy indicates, he is utterly lacking in the
hubris that surely tempts those who don the federal judicial robe with
its important power and its life tenure. Instead, he teaches by
example a diametrically opposite lesson for those who might hold
power; he is loyal, devoted to family, fundamentally decent, and never
too busy to do a good deed in the midst of working tirelessly to
achieve excellence. The voluminous, serious Becker jurisprudence is
part of his legacy, but so is his creation of a universe of people that he
has connected by mutual care and respect. He does not preach
Michael Grunwald, No Order in Courting of Law Clerks; Judges Trample on Efforts to
Rein In Annual Bidding for Students, WASH. PoST, Feb. 16, 1999, at A3; Deborah Pines,
FederalJudges Try To Fix Frantic Clerk Hiring Process, N.Y. L.J., June 14, 1993, at 1. The
system has degenerated to the point where the top law students are being hired into
federal appellate clerkships during the fall of their second year, making the first year
the prime, indeed the only, indication of legal ability the hiringjudge has.
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kindness or goodness; he just is. For every clerk that has the privilege
to work for him, his personal example is a gift to be opened in future
days when they are tempted to turn away from that which is good for
whatever expedient end.
Judge Becker is, in short, the virtuous, gifted, hard-working public
servant the Framers hoped would volunteer for the heavy labor of
public service. In no small part because of individuals like him, the
United States constitutional experiment is as successful as it is.
II. CHIEFJUDGE BECKER, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAWJURJST
The record of Chief Judge Becker's constitutional law opinions
opens a window into the processes of the Becker chambers, but also
into the work of the federal judiciary. In thirty years of serving on the
district and then appellate benches, he has written opinions in 17 First
Amendment cases, 37 Fifth Amendment cases, 62 Fourteenth
Amendment cases, and more, for a total of 127 constitutional law
cases altogether." But these numbers provide only a profile of the
body of work that is there. The cases cover a difficult-to-digest array of
disputes with each one carefully calibrated to answer the questions
presented carefully and thoroughly.
To give a sense of the Becker jurisprudence and of the federal
docket in general, I will focus on a subset of his constitutional law
opinions-the First Amendment opinions. I choose them not only
because the First Amendment is one of my specialties, but also
because one might think that the First Amendment is a fairly closed
category of issues. The Becker First Amendment opinions delineate a
strange and huge universe of issues a federal judge can face, even
under a single category like the First Amendment.
Over the course of thirty years, the judge has written seventeen
First Amendment opinions. He has, of course, joined many others,
but he has written the opinion for the court in seventeen, and those
opinions address an amazing range of factual situations, including a
drug raid at a fraternity, a lottery kickback scheme, and emblems on
corrections officials' uniforms. Each exhibits the classic Becker
approach: dig into the legal background, explain that background to
6 Se infia app.
7 &,e Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435 (3d Cir.
2000) (drug raid at fraternity); United States v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 1997)
(lottery kickback scheme); Troster v. Pa. State Dep't of Corr., 65 F.3d 1086 (3d Cir.
1995) (emblems on uniforms).
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the reader in a straightforward way, refuse to duck the hard or the
boring (often procedural) issues, and reach a conclusion based on the
best available indication of the Circuit's and the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence. Remarkably, there is only one dissent from Judge
Becker's reasoning in this group.8 The opinions are bristling with
issues of standards of review and procedural requirements, the nitty
gritty of federal litigation he willingly takes on as part of his obligation
to provide a full answer to the litigants in front of him. My purpose
here is not to dissect the opinions doctrinally, but rather to describe
the wide canvas on which a federal judge paints and the approach
taken by the Becker chambers.
In Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. University of Pittsburgh, a
fraternity challenged the university's disciplinary action following a
drug raid at the fraternity house on the grounds that it violated the
First Amendment's right to free association: Chief Judge Becker,
writing for the court, explained quite cogently that the Supreme
Court had recognized in recent cases two types of rights of
association-intimate and expressive-and that the fraternity had
engaged in neither First Amendment-related type of association and
therefore had no First Amendment right to challenge the disciplinary
action." The opinion nimbly summarizes and assesses the Court's
recent doctrine. As it pays close attention to the controlling law, it
also resonates with common sense. Whatever the Framers may have
meant by a right to association (a phrase of more recent vintage), it
was not intended to nor should it provide a defense to the reasonable
consequences of illegal drug use on a college campus."
3 See Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 1043 (3d Cir. 1994) (Garth, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
9 229 F.3d at 435.
1o Id. at 442, 444, 447.
1 Cf David Cole, Hanging with the Wrong Crowd: Of Gangs, Terrorists and the Pght (f
Association, 1999 Sup. GT. REv. 203, 206 (arguing that jurisprudence of association
"should protect association in its physical manifestations as well as its abstract
essence"); Shannon L. Doering, Treading on the Constitution To Get a Foot in the Clubhouse
Door, 78 NEB. L. REv. 644, 645 (1999) (arguing that "the application of public
accomodation laws against a group such as the Boy Scouts is an unconstitutional
infringement of the group's right of 'expressive association"'); Nancy S. Horton.
Traditional Single Sex Fraternities on College Campuses: Will The't Survive in the 1990s 18
J.C. & U.L. 419, 444 n.128 (1992) ("'Fraternities don't generally engage in these types
of protected activities, at least not in the way constitutional protection is normally
thought to be afforded to these activities.'" (quoting Nathaniel R. Jones, The Future of
Single-Sex Fraternities, 23 FRATERNAL L. 1, 4 (1988))); Scott Patrick McBride, Comment,
Freedom of Association in the Public University Setting: How Broad Is the Right To Freely
Participate in Greek Life?, 23 U. DAYTON L. REv. 133, 135 (1997) ("[U]niversity
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To illustrate the range of issues that a federal appellate judge can
hear, sixteen years earlier Judge Becker wrote the opinion for the
court in a case again involving university students, who this time tried
to hold group sales demonstrations of china and cookware in
dormitories.'2 In this case, the First Amendment's commercial speech
doctrine came into play, making this only the third case in which the
judge has written an opinion on this aspect of the First Amendment.
3
On the one hand, it is remarkable that a topic that is a staple in every
First Amendment course in law schools would not be the subject of
more opinions during thirty years on the bench, but on the other
hand, it is yet another example of the amazing array of interactions
that can find their way into the federal courts on constitutional
challenges.
Eight years before the fraternity drug bust case, the judge was
presented with a very different right of association claim. When the
government sought an injunction to bar a union member with ties to
organized crime from further activity with the union, the union raised
a First Amendment right of association defense." The opinion is
intage Becker as it painstakingly addresses the threshold issues of
evidence, federal court rules, labor relations, and then the First
Amendment. The detail even drove the judge to include a thorough
outline, which is far more common in law review articles than judicial
opinions.'
In Weizel v. Tucker, Judge Becker, writing for an en banc court,
waded into the treacherous doctrinal waters surrounding the question
of when an employee of a public institution may be discharged for
political affiliation.' Although there is a general default rule that
public employees retain their rights of free speech and association,
when such an employee is sufficiently involved in policymaking, the
government may make choices favoring those with certain political
viewpoints over others. The case turned on which category of public
job the "Authority Solicitor" of a public hospital fell into-
requirements placed on Greek social organizations... may violate the constitutionally
protected freedom of association.").
2 See Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. Pa. State Univ., 752 F.2d 854 (3d Cir. 1984).
J So', abso Rappa, 18 F.3d 1043; Felmeister v. Office of Attorney Ethics, 856 F.2d
529 (3d Cir. 1988).
United States v. Local 560 (I.B.T.), 974 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1992).
Id. at 320-21.
139 F.3d 380, 381 (3d Cir. 1998).
17 Id. at 383 (citing Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 367-38 (1976), and Branti v.
Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980)).
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policymaking or not.'3 There were no cases that directly determined
the result, therefore, the burden rested on Judge Becker to explain
and justify the judgment employed to reach a conclusion. In a clear
and persuasive opinion, Judge Becker held that the position was
political in nature and therefore the discharge did not violate the First
Amendment.' 9
Not only has the judge addressed, in the tricky context of the First
Amendment, fraternity drug use, public employee discharges, and
campaign contribution limitations, not discussed in detail here, but
he also penned a case involving the secrecy of grand jury proceedings
in the context of a state lottery kickback scheme. In United States v.
Smith, Judge Becker held for the court that the press did not have an
unfettered right to the papers from secret grand jury proceedings
involving a state lottery kickback scheme.' ° Some of the material that
the press sought was already made public, which would tend to make
the material more accessible to the press.2 ' The opinion, which holds
that the papers need not be disclosed to the press, faces the facts
squarely and proceeds methodically and carefully, explaining each
step in its reasoning with clarity as it acknowledges the lacunae in the
law. While the result is counterintuitive to some degree, it is
persuasively explained and justified.
In 1995, the judge authored an opinion addressing free speech
issues in yet another unusual context. A state corrections officer
challenged the requirement that he wear an American flag on his
uniform because he thought it was disrespectful of the flag. He
argued that the flag emblem was compelled speech in violation of the
First Amendment.' 3 The opinion's reasoning rejecting that claim isvintage Becker chambers:
[T)he Supreme Court has cautioned that the First Amendment should
not be held to shield a limitless variety of conduct from governmental
regulation. Thus, sympathetic as we may be to Troster's genuine
patriotism as well as with his predicament, we cannot accept his
suggestion that we hold, as a matter of "common sense" and law, that the
mere act of wearing a uniform with a flag patch on it constitutes an
'8 See Wetzel 139 F.3d at 384.
Id. at 385-86.
20 123 F.3d 140, 156 (3d Cir. 1997).
21 Id. at 154.
22 SeeTrosterv. Pa. State Dep't of Corrs., 65 F.3d 1086 (3d Cir. 1995).
23 Id. at 1087.
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expressive or communicative "use" of the flag.
Respect for the First Amendment claims brought, a human
acknowledgment of the difficult position for the claimant, and,
ultimately, a resort to sound judgment gives the opinion legitimacy
and weight.
The judge's solid judgment was also on display in Amato v. Wilentz,
in which a county brought an action against the Chief Justice of the
New Jersey Supreme Court who barred Warner Brothers access to a
county courthouse to film a movie scene.5 His reason: he did not like
the way in which African-Americans were to be depicted in the scene.26
The county, which stood to receive $250,000 from the studio, raised
First Amendment challenges to the denial of access to the building.
"2 7
While acknowledging that the Chief Justice's content-based decision
was troubling, and it certainly was, Judge Becker focused on the
necessary threshold question to the First Amendment issue: did the
county have third-party standing to assert the rights of the movie
studio? In a thorough analysis of third-party standing, the Judge,
writing for the court, reached the conclusion that fits with the law, but
also with common sense: the county did not have the power to
institute this suit on First Amendment grounds when the party directly
harmed and capable of bringing the First Amendment challenge-
Warner Brothers-could have and did not.2
The cases also provide a window into the evolution of society.
Judge Becker's first opinion implicating the First Amendment, in
1974, involved a challenge by Philadelphia firemen to beard and hair
length regulations.' The firemen argued that they had a First
Amendment right to have long hair regardless of the safety
requirements of their jobs. In his inimitable way, the judge
acknowledged their feelings about the matter:
[W]e have found here two men who are concerned about their personal
appearance: Michini wants to fit in with his peers and Barbera wants to
be fashionable. Of course, we find this understandable, but still this
gains them no First Amendment protection [sufficient to override the
"' Id. at 1092.
952 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1991).
Id. at 743.
7 Id.
Id. at 750.
Z, SieMichini v. Rizzo, 379 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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regulations in this case]."
Common sense prevailed again.
In some ways, the task of applying any particular label to Judge
Becker's opinions is a hopeless one. There is no trademark agenda,
no pitch to any particular crowd, and certainly no grandstanding. To
the contrary, he treats, in depth and at length, issues other judges
would as soon move past, letting the issues determine the scope of any
opinion rather than his predilection to address the same. His
opinions do not reveal a man using his position to ride particular
hobby horses, but rather a fair-minded man who views the cases
before him as serious matters deserving his and his clerks' full
attention. The vast variety of situations does not faze Judge Becker
because he already treats each case as a fresh case on its own bottom.
The ethic of the Becker chambers comes through repeatedly as
one reads these cases: his role is not to announce rules from on high,
like Zeus, but rather to work through the existing law, to examine with
a microscope all of the issues presented in a case, and to lay out the
relevant reasoning with clarity in an organized fashion. Frankly, it is
the work ethic of the ideal federal judge. No one could or should ask
for more.
CONCLUSION
From the lens ofJudge Becker's First Amendment cases, the work
of the federal judiciary appears interesting but also daunting, if it is to
be done well. A federal judge is by necessity a generalist, and Judge
Becker has refused to transform that necessity into an excuse for
avoiding hard, uninteresting issues or to let it argue for a lesser
devotion to details. Instead, he has made it his mission to become a
specialist in each issue before him, whether it has appeared before or
will ever appear again. Every comer of a litigant's argument is
scrutinized for chinks and .research is done well beyond the four
comers of the parties' arguments to test them. There is no adequate
explanation for his remarkable devotion to intellectual rigor and
excellence other than his sense of obligation to the citizens and the
country he serves. He treats his position as a federal judge as a high
calling and lives up to the ideal he has posited in chambers. This
good man is the people's good fortune.
As I said on the occasion of the dedication of his portrait in the
30 Id. at 848.
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Third Circuit, and it is worth repeating here, it is hard to be Chief
Judge Becker. The world would be a better place if more aspired to
his ideals and more succeeded as he does.
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APPENDIX
ARTICLE 1
Article 1, Section 7
1. United States v. Gozlon-Peretz, 894 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir. 1990)
Article 1, Section 8, Clause 3
2. United States v. Rodia, 194 F.3d 465 (3d Cir. 1999)
[Lutz v. York, Pa., 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990) (included under
Fourteenth Amendment)]
3. Swin Res. Sys., Inc. v. Lycoming County, Pa., 883 F.2d 245 (3d Cir.
1989)
[United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987)
(included under Eleventh Amendment) ]
Article 1, Sections 9 & 10
4. Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 161 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 1998)
[Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996) (included
under Article III) ]
[United States v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550 (3d Cir. 1994) (included
under Fourth Amendment)]
5. United States v. Kopp, 951 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1991)
6. United States ex. rel. Forman v. McCall, 776 F.2d 1156 (3d Cir.
1985)
7. Roysterv. Fauver, 775 F.2d 527 (3d Cir. 1985)
8. Crowell v. United States Parole Comm'n, 724 F.2d 1406 (3d Cir.
1984)
9. United States ex. rel. Forman v. McCall, 709 F.2d 852 (3d Cir.
1983)
ARTICLE 2
1. Ameron, Inc. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 809 F.2d 979
(3d Cir. 1986)
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ARTICLE 3
1. I1 re PWS Holding Corp., 228 F.3d 224 (3d Cir. 2000)
2. Doe v. Nat'l Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 199 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 1999)
3. At-way v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996)
4. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 912 F.2d 643 (3d Cir.
1990)
5. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 893 F.2d 541 (3d Cir. 1990)
SEPARATION OF POWERS
1. Ii re Richards, 213 F.3d 773 (3d Cir. 2000)
2. Smith v. Magras, 124 F.3d 457 (3d Cir. 1997)
3. Neely v. Club Med Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 63 F.3d 166 (3d Cir. 1995)
4. I1 reBusy Beaver Bldg. Ctrs., Inc., 19 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994)
5. Consumer Partyv. Davis, 778 F.2d 140 (3d Cir. 1985)
6. United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 455 F. Supp.
857 (E.D. Pa. 1978)
7. United States ex rel. Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976 (E.D. Pa.
1977)
FEDERAL QUESTION CASES
1. Schall v.Joyce, 885 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1989)
2. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n v. Muir, 792 F.2d 356 (3d Cir. 1986)
3. Lancellotti v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 704 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1983)
FIRST AMENDMENT
1. Pi Lambda Phi Fraternity, Inc. v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 229 F.3d 435
(3d Cir. 2000)
2. Mariani v. United States., 212 F.3d 761 (3d Cir. 2000)
3. Wetzel v. Tucker, 139 F.3d 380 (3d Cir. 1998)
4. United States v. Smith, 123 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 1997)
[Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996) (included
under Article III)]
5. Troster v. Pa. State Dep't of Corrs., 65 F.3d 1086 (3d Cir. 1995)
6. Rappa v. New Castle County, 18 F.3d 535 (3d Cir. 1994)
[Donatelli v. Mitchell, 2 F.3d 508 (3d Cir. 1993) (included under
Fourteenth Amendment)]
7. United States v. Local 560 (I.B.T.), 974 F.2d 315 (3d Cir. 1992)
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8. Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742 (3d Cir. 1991)
[Lutz v. York, Pa., 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990) (included under
Fourteenth Amendment) ]
9. Cole v. Flick, 758 F.2d 124 (3d Cir. 1985)
10. Am. Future Sys., Inc. v. Pa. State Univ., 752 F.2d 854 (3d Cir.
1984)
11. Democratic Party of the United States v. Nat'l Conservative
Political Action Comm., 578 F. Supp. 797 (E.D. Pa. 1983)
12. Abraham v. Pekarski, 537 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
13. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp.
866 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
14. Michini v. Rizzo, 379 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
FOURTH AMENDMENT
[Urretia v. Harrisburg County Police Dep't, 91 F.3d 451 (3d Cir.
1996) (included under Fifth Amendment)]
1. United States v. Menon, 24 F.3d 550 (3d Cir. 1994)
2. United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990)
3. In reSearch Warrant (Sealed), 810 F.2d 67 (3d Cir. 1987)
[United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412 (3d Cir. 1985) (included
under Fifth Amendment)]
4. United States v. Kulp, 365 F. Supp. 747 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
FIFTH AMENDMENT
1. United States v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147 (3d
Cir. 2000)
[West v. Vaughn, 204 F.3d 53 (3d Cir. 2000) (included under
Fourteenth Amendment)]
2. United States v. Nathan, 188 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 1999)
3. Unity Real Estate Co. v. Hudson, 178 F.3d 649 (3d Cir. 1999)
4. Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Augusta, 178 F.3d 132 (3d Cir. 1999)
[Mathews v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 161 F.3d 156 (3d Cir. 1998)
(included under Article 1, Section 9)]
5. United States v. Nolan-Cooper, 155 F.3d 221 (3d Cir. 1998)
6. United States v. Murray, 144 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 1998)
7. In reTutu Wells Contamination Litig., 120 F.3d 368 (3d Cir. 1997)
8. Urretia v. Harrisburg County Police Dep't, 91 F.3d 451 (3d Cir.
1996)
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9. Lindsey Coal Mining Co. v. Chater, 90 F.3d 688 (3d Cir. 1996)
[Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996) (included
under Article III cases) ]
10. Parry v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 1995)
11. I re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab.
Litig., 55 F.3d 768 (3d Cir. 1995)
[Wilmer v. Johnson, 30 F.3d 451 (3d Cir. 1994) (included under
Fourteenth Amendment Cases) ]
12. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Daddona, 9 F.3d 312 (3d Cir. 1993)
13. United States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1992)
14. United States v.John, 936 F.2d 764 (3d Cir. 1991)
15. Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396 (3d Cir. 1991)
[Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1990) (included
under Fourteenth Amendment)]
[United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990)
(included under Fourth Amendment) ]
16. Thompson v. Owens, 889 F.2d 500 (3d Cir. 1989)
17. Montgomery Nat'l Bank v. Clarke, 882 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1989)
18. I1 re Real Estate Title & Settlement Servs. Antitrust Litig., 869 F.2d
760 (3d Cir. 1989)
[Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1988) (included under
Fourteenth Amendment)]
19. United States v. Katzin, 824 F.2d 234 (3d Cir. 1987)
20. United States v. Oliver, 787 F.2d 124 (3d Cir. 1986)
21. United Retail & Wholesale Employees Teamsters Union Local No.
115 Pension Plan v. Yahn & McDonnell Inc., 787 F.2d 128 (3d Cir.
1986)
22. United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412 (3d Cir. 1985)
23. Tustin v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1984)
24. DeLeon v. Susquehanna Cmty. Sch. Dist., 747 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.
1984)
25. Krynicky v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1984)
26. Diggs v. United States, 740 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1984)
27. United States v. Baylin, 696 F.2d 1030 (3d Cir. 1982)
28. Neal v. Sec'y of the Navy, 472 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
29. Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191
(E.D. Pa. 1974)
30. United States ex rel. Lowery v. Rundle, 326 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Pa.
1971)
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SIXTH AMENDMENT
1. United States v. Edmonds, 80 F.3d 810 (3d Cir. 1996)
[Parry v. Rosemeyer, 64 F.3d 110 (3d Cir. 1995) (included under
Fifth Amendment)]
2. Hull v. Freeman, 932 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1991)
[United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990)
(included under Fourth Amendment)]
3. Burkettv. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1987)
[United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412 (3d Cir. 1985) (included
under Fifth Amendment) ]
[Mastrota v. Robinson, 534 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (included
under Fourteenth Amendment) ]
[United States v. Ad. Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (included under Fourteenth Amendment)]
4. Taylor v. United States, 386 F. Supp. 132 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
SEVENTH AMENDMENT
1. Dardovitch v. Haltzman, 190 F.3d 125 (3d Cir. 1999)
2. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp.
889 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
[United States v. Ad. Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa.
1977) (included under Fourteenth Amendment)]
EIGHTH AMENDMENT
[Urretia v. Harrisburg County Police Dep't, 91 F.3d 451 (3d Cir.
1996) (included under Fifth Amendment)]
NINTH AMENDMENT
[Stull v. Sch. Bd. of W. Beaver Junior-Senior High Sch., 459 F.2d
339 (3d Cir. 1972) (included under Fourteenth Amendment)]
ELEVENTH AMENDMENT
1. United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987)
2. Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 426 F. Supp 1297 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
[United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1988)
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(included under Eleventh Amendment) ]
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
1. Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2000)
2. Boyanoski v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 215 F.3d 396 (3d
Cir. 2000)
3. Wilson v. Russo, 212 F.3d 781 (3d Cir. 2000)
4. West v. Vaughn, 204 F.3d 761 (3d Cir. 2000)
5. Stern v. Halligan, 158 F.3d 729 (3d Cir. 1998)
6. Imo Indus., Inc. v. Kickert AG, 155 F.3d 254 (3d Cir. 1998)
7. Ersekv. Township of Springfield, 102 F.3d 79 (3d Cir. 1996)
[Urretia v. Harrisburg County Police Dep't, 91 F.3d 451 (3d Cir.
1996) (included under Fifth Amendment)]
[Artway v. Attorney Gen., 81 F.3d 1235 (3d Cir. 1996) (included
under Article III)]
8. Wilmerv.Johnson, 30 F.3d 451 (3d Cir. 1994)
9. Guarinov. Larsen, 11 F.3d 1151 (3d Cir. 1993)
10. Donatelli v. Mitchell, 2 F.3d 508 (3d Cir. 1993)
11. Isidor Paiewonsky Assocs. v. Sharp Props., Inc., 998 F.2d 145 (3d
Cir. 1993).
[United States v. Spiropoulos, 976 F.2d 155 (3d Cir. 1992)
(included under Fifth Amendment)]
12. Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348 (3d Cir. 1992)
13. United States v. Parson, 955 F.2d 858 (3d Cir. 1992)
14. Knight v. Tape, 935 F.2d 617 (3d Cir. 1991)
[Hull v. Freeman, 932 F.2d 159 (3d Cir. 1991) (included under
Sixth Amendment)]
[Young v. Kann, 926 F.2d 1396 (3d Cir. 1991) (included under
Fifth Amendment)]
15. Brown v. Grabowski, 922 F.2d 1097 (3d Cir. 1990)
16. Shaw by Strain v. Strackhouse, 920 F.2d 1135 (3d Cir. 1990)
[United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990)
(included under Fourth Amendment)]
17. Lutz v. York, Pa., 899 F.2d 255 (3d Cir. 1990)
[Montgomery Nat'l Bank v. Clarke, 882 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1989)
(included under Fifth Amendment) ]
18. Marshall v. Lansing, 839 F.2d 933 (3d Cir. 1988)
[United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987)
(included under Eleventh Amendment) ]
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[Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1987) (included
under Sixth Amendment) ]
[United States v. Sebetich, 776 F.2d 412 (3d Cir. 1985) (included
under Fifth Amendment) ]
[DeLeon v. Susquehanna Cmty. Sch. Dist., 747 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.
1984) (included under Fifth Amendment)]
[Krynicky v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 742 F.2d 94 (3d Cir. 1984)
(included under Fifth Amendment)]
19. Kunkel's Estate v. United States, 689 F.2d 408 (3d Cir. 1982)
[Abraham v. Pekarski, 537 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (included
under First Amendment) ]
20. Mastrota v. Robinson, 534 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa. 1982)
21. Loweryv. Cuyler, 521 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
22. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp.
1100 (E.D. Pa. 1981)
23. Locust v. Degiovanni, 485 F. Supp. 551 (E.D. Pa. 1980)
[Neal v. Sec'y of the Navy, 472 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1979)
(included under Fifth Amendment) ]
24. United States v. Ad. Richfield Co., 429 F. Supp. 830 (E.D. Pa.
1977)
25. Crosley v. Davis, 426 F. Supp. 389 (E.D. Pa. 1977)
26. Filsam Corp. v. Dyer, 422 F. Supp. 1126 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
27. Gurlyv. Wohlgemuth, 421 F. Supp 1337 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
28. United States v. Brown, 417 F. Supp. 340 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
29. Local No. 1 (ACA), Broadcast Employees of the Int'l Bhd. of
Teamsters v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 419 F. Supp. 263 (E.D. Pa.
1976)
30. United States ex rel. Bennett v. Prasse, 408 F. Supp. 988 (E.D. Pa.
1976)
31. DiAngelo v. United States, 406 F. Supp. 880 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
32. United States ex rel. Smith v. Johnson, 403 F. Supp. 1381 (E.D. Pa.
1975)
33. Peeke v. Penn Cent. Transp. Co., 403 F. Supp. 70 (E.D. Pa. 1975)
34. United States ex rel. Cannon v. Johnson, 396 F. Supp. 1362 (E.D.
Pa. 1975)
[Michini v. Rizzo, 379 F. Supp. 837 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (included
under First Amendment) ]
35. Vecchione v. Wohlgemuth, 377 F. Supp. 1361 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
36. United States ex rel. Russell v. Hendrick, 376 F. Supp. 158 (E.D. Pa.
1974)
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37. Bauer v. Sielaff, 372 F. Supp. 1104 (E.D. Pa. 1974)
[Oxford First Corp. v. PNC Liquidating Corp., 372 F. Supp. 191
(E.D. Pa. 1974) (included under Fifth Amendment)]
38. Schlesinger v. Bldg. Sen,. Emp. Int'l Union, Local 252 (AFL-CIO),
367 F. Supp. 760 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
39. Mackensworth v. Am. Trading Transp. Co., 367 F. Supp. 373 (E.D.
Pa. 1973)
40. Stull v. Sch. Bd. of W. Beaver Junior-Senior High Sch., 459 F.2d
339 (3d Cir. 1972)
41. United States v. Lanni, 335 F. Supp. 1060 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
42. Charleston v. Wohlgemuth, 332 F. Supp. 1175 (E.D. Pa. 1971)
43. United States ex rel. Burkett v. Rundle, 329 F. Supp. 204 (E.D. Pa.
1971)
44. Groffv. Wohlgemuth, 328 F. Supp. 1016 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
45. United States ex rel. Tonzi v. Laird, 327 F. Supp. 1389 (E.D. Pa.
1971)
46. Lebowitz v. Forbes Leasing & Fin. Corp., 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D.
Pa. 1971)
NINETEENTH AMENDMENT
[United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987)
(included under Eleventh Amendment) ]
TWENTY-FOURTH AMENDMENT
[United States v. Union Gas Co., 832 F.2d 1343 (3d Cir. 1987)
(included under Eleventh Amendment) ]
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